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Abstract: The Wireless Medium Access Control (WMAC) protocol functions by handling various
data frames in order to forward them to neighbor sensor nodes. Under this circumstance, WMAC
policies need secure data communication rules and intrusion detection procedures to safeguard the
data from attackers. The existing secure Medium Access Control (MAC) policies provide expected
and predictable practices against channel attackers. These security policies can be easily breached by
any intelligent attacks or malicious actions. The proposed Wireless Interleaved Honeypot-Framing
Model (WIHFM) newly implements distributed honeypot-based security mechanisms in each sensor
node to act reactively against various attackers. The proposed WIHFM creates an optimal Wireless
Sensor Network (WSN) channel model, Wireless Interleaved Honeypot Frames (WIHFs), secure hashbased random frame-interleaving principles, node-centric honeypot engines, and channel-covering
techniques. Compared to various existing MAC security policies, the proposed model transforms
unpredictable IHFs into legitimate frame sequences against channel attackers. Additionally, introducing WIHFs is a new-fangled approach for distributed WSNs. The successful development
of the proposed WIHFM ensures resilient security standards and neighbor-based intrusion alert
procedures for protecting MAC frames. Particularly, the proposed wireless honeypot methodology
creates a novel idea of using honeypot frame traps against open wireless channel attacks. The
development of a novel wireless honeypot traps deals with various challenges such as distributed
honeypot management principles (node-centric honeypot, secretly interleaved-framing principles,
and interleaving/de-interleaving procedures), dynamic network backbone management principles
(On Demand Acyclic Connectivity model), and distributed attack isolation policies. This effort
provides an effective wireless attack-trapping solution in dynamic WSNs. The simulation results
show the advantage of the proposed WIHFM over the existing techniques such as Secure Zebra
MAC (SZ-MAC), Blockchain-Assisted Secure-Routing Mechanism (BASR), and the Trust-Based Node
Evaluation (TBNE) procedure. The experimental section confirms the proposed model attains a 10%
to 14% superior performance compared to the existing techniques.
Keywords: wireless sensor networks; security; wireless honeypots; Medium Access; wireless
medium; attacks
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1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are diversely used for significant applications such
as industrial automation, animal-tracking systems, ocean-monitoring systems, defense
support systems, rural surveillance systems [1], and others. Usually, WSNs are created
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with numerous wireless sensor nodes placed around the required geographical locations.
The sensor nodes are deployed on land surfaces, water surfaces, and other hostile regions
to sense the ecological data from various objects.
The sensed data are processed and communicated to respective sink nodes through
multi-hop-routing procedures. The data on the wireless medium are more vulnerable
compared to dedicated wired channels. WSNs need optimal protection via channel security
for their application-specific network architectures. As wireless sensor nodes operate under
limited internal resources with respect to their memory, battery source, and processor
efficiency, the security algorithms must provide efficient and lightweight solutions against
unexpected channel attacks. Secure wireless data communication is essential against both
active and passive attackers. The intrusions and attacks that infiltrate into data sequences
on air create opportunities for data theft, identity theft, packet drops, wormholes, sinkholes,
and other functional irregularities in WSNs. Attacks on wireless channels are more frequent
than on wired channels. In the absence of steadfast secure servers and protected channels,
the wireless sensor nodes meet open threats to live data transmissions. The technical
contributions of global research are growing and thereby enabling the construction of
flexible network security models for WSNs. Generally, the current wireless security models
use cryptography techniques, key distribution models, blockchain technology, Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS), and channel-aware-data-hiding mechanisms.
The dedicated wired network infrastructures use firewalls, secure private network
policies, centralized IDS engines, honeypots, and key distribution servers to handle attacks
efficiently. Among these security models, honeypots are a collection of decoy network
systems positioned among legitimate network resources. The honeypot security mechanism
provides a virtual system trap with fake utilities to attract both internal and external attacks.
The honeypot environment receives the incoming events and analyzes the features to
decide the attacks. Here, the attackers may utilize and harm the fake resources. The results
generated from honeypot engines help to enrich the network security policies gradually.
Honeypots are classified under various categories as highly interactive models, lowly
interactive models, research models, and production models. Unlike wired network security
models, wireless networks need more flexibility in their security layer functions. Particularly, a
WSN requires completely distributed and lightweight security mechanisms that are controlled
at each sensor node. The proposed WIHFM is aimed at developing a distributed honeypot
environment in each sensor node to secure wireless mediums. According to the proposed idea,
each sensor node holds fake internal resources to trap the attackers. The proposed model has
been created for developing lightweight honeypot resources in each node with IHF contents.
In this newly developed environment, the attacker trap has been created by a WIHFM that is
shared among legitimate data frames on the wireless channel.
The wireless MAC (802.11) policies and legitimate data frames are vulnerable to attacks. The combination of node-centric honeypot engines and the IHF traps increases the
possibility of attracting various attacks from other sensor nodes. The currently accessible
secure data communication models are widely anticipated and estimated by intellectual
attackers. Regarding the choice of WSN security solutions, Mezrag et al. [2] proposed
a lightweight energy-efficient cryptography scheme for secure data communication. In
this work, secure data communication was achieved through Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(identification-based cryptography techniques in the clustered WSN environment). Additionally, this scheme was assisted with distributed key distribution models. In this manner,
the existing security principles stated that the identity model assured protection against
different types of attacks in a WSN.
On the other hand, this technique was not enabled over random WSNs with deeply
analyzed results. Guimaraes et al. [3] compared and analyzed various security protocol solutions and channel protection models for WSNs. In their analysis, the security solutions were
identified as public key cryptography techniques, private key models, message authentication
codes, secure hash codes, and others. The experimental details of this work are revealed
through power consumption analysis, memory complexity analysis, and time complexity
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analysis exercises. Similarly, Sharma et al. [4] and Bhushan et al. [5] described the details of
wireless security challenges and security protocols suitable for WSNs. Based on notable technical contributions, the particular type of WSN architecture and application-specific network
model should be assisted by optimal security features. In this stream, Majid et al. [6] provided
the details of WSN application models and security solutions. Han et al. [7] proposed genetic
algorithm frameworks for enabling trust-based secure-routing mechanisms.
Correspondingly, this technique targeted the benefit of energy-aware-routing principles. Based on security concerns, Huanan et al. [8] shared vast scopes and information
on the security benefits and applications of WSNs. As many studies and technical surveys on secure data communication reveal the current solutions and limitations against
various attacks, the attack types are identified as basically active and passive. In this case,
the denial of service, data modification, masquerading, channel interruption, misrouting
activities, and other live suspicious actions are categorized under active attacks. In contrast,
eavesdropping and unauthorized traffic-analyzing procedures are classified under passive
attacks. In this regard, Keerthika et al. [9] described various types of malicious events such
as physical attacks, link layer attacks, routing attacks, SYN-flooding attacks, smurf attacks,
session-stealing attacks, and data security attacks according to the respective layers. The
comprehensive understanding and comparative descriptions of various attacks inform the
protection measures towards the data protection challenges in WSNs. In addition, this
work suggested appropriate countermeasure techniques for different attacks.
Generally, the application of WSNs decides the levels of security features to be configured
in the real-time conditions. In this case, Majid et al. [6] deeply analyzed the growth of WSNs
regarding their support for industrial revolution practices. According to the analysis of WSNs’
application domains, a technological growth is expected in Internet of Things (IoT)-based
solutions and other control systems. Particularly, the application of WSNs spreads through
intelligent military infrastructures, health-monitoring systems, home automation systems,
smart city management systems, agriculture automation systems, intelligent transportation
systems, and other industrial control systems. Based on the required WSN’s model, the
security policies are differently configured against expected attacks.
At the research stage, security concerns are seriously evaluated, and various solutions
are proposed. Salau et al. [10] described the data security measures taken towards the
protection of radio channel communications against attacks. According to this description,
data security measures are expected to be taken in accordance with integrity, confidentiality,
and authentication policies. On the same ground, the network’s stabilization must be
assured in terms of availability. Almesaeed et al. [11] proposed channel protection and
energy regulation schemes among Sybil attackers in WSNs. Sybil attackers mainly target
the identities of sensor nodes. Notably, this type of attack manipulates numerous fake
identities of a sensor node to damage the network reputations.
The channel protection schemes proposed in this work are equipped with node validity
schemes, secure channel profile-sharing principles, signal strength indicators, and cluster
management principles. Similarly, a few research methodologies found possible solutions
to provide secure data transmission solutions under IoT-based WSNs [12]. Anyhow, the
strategies used for promoting such data transmission solutions to ensure secure WSNs in a
challenging environment are limited.
Wang et al. [13] found a correlation between the pandemic timeline and the attacks
generated among IoT networks. This work analyzed critical security problems of the IoT
environment through honeypot principles. According to the network architecture, this
scheme deployed more than 450 honeypot engines around various geolocations. This
work evaluates a real-time botnet attack detection mechanism using distributed honeypot
architecture at different locations. The idea behind this honeypot model is to expose
the practical possibilities of real-time botnet classification procedures. In this regard,
the methodology has been designed to model numerous botnet attacks into honeypot
systems. In accordance with this observation, this work finds the fragmental impacts of
botnet activities and statistical findings on the systems’ performance. The continuation of
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honeypot-based security models is more useful for developing real-time trap systems in
order to improve security practices.
In the same manner, Lygerou et al. [14] proposed distributed honeypot models for
securing android devices. As this work focused on cellular network security principles,
the distributed honeypots were configured for operating mobile devices (on an android
platform). Similarly, the proper identification of IoT protocols interacting with mobile
devices assures the actual benefit of distributed honeypot systems. In this case, the IoT protocols and the security features were analyzed for message-queuing protocols, constrained
application protocols, and low-power and lossy network protocols. Mostly, the honeypot
security principles are initiated from conventional data analysis tactics for detecting the
attacks. For improving the efficiency of standard honeypot models, machine leaning and
deep learning algorithms are widely applied in WSNs.
On the basis of motivation, Veluchamy et al. [15] proposed deep learning-basedhoneypot-modelling strategies. Particularly, this approach applied deep reinforcementlearning practices to understand and detect DoS attacks at run-time. According to this
approach, deep neural network functions were created to validate the internal and remote
requests belonging to the network. The strategy of this work continued to compute deep
score values (Q-Matrix) for network events and stated them as rewards. The experimental
platform of this work initiated internal DoS events, external DoS events, website attacks,
botnet attacks, and brute force attacks against deep learning-based honeypot systems.
Nevertheless, a lack of system flexibility is identified in this dedicated network scenario.
Considering the computation load and time complexities, Acosta et al. [16] developed
lightweight reactive honeypot principles for improving the security features of cyber deception
models. In general, cyber deception is the strategy used for tricking the attackers into fake
resources (honeypot). As discussed earlier, the network architecture expects suitable security
functions through static models or dynamic models. The honeypot is the main security
provision to assure security traps and collect the event data within them. In this case, the
static model honeypots activate and control (warn) the internal node functions based on
the legitimacy of the cyber event. Considering the issue, this lightweight honeypot model
developed reactive node organization and channel organization principles against attacks.
This mechanism ensured more optimal management routines than static honeypot approaches.
In the sequence of security considerations, Pashaei et al. [17] stated the strategy of
early state intrusion detection techniques with the help of honeypots in an industrial
network environment. The idea of this work was based on using Markov chain process and
action-reward policies in order to observe network events continuously. The state-based
honeypot event analysis model was configured to detect and isolate distributed DoS attacks
and Man-in-the-Middle attacks. As mentioned, this work operated reinforcement-learning
principles and Markov chain principles to detect suspicious events as quick as possible. In
addition, this scheme assured its better accuracy rate based on the best reward weights
according to changing event states.
As discussed in this section, various security models and honeypot frameworks are
suggested to improve network security metrics. Furthermore, the honeypot-based security
limitations are identified for MAC principles. As many research techniques consider networklevel security challenges, the identification of channel security and MAC security provides an
important and novel suggestion for innovative honeypot strategies. In this regard, this article
finds the crucial limitations of the existing systems such as the lack of novel secure MAC
models, distributed honeypot engines, Interleaved Honeypot Frame (IHF) solutions, and open
traps in WSN. These are considered major research problems under growing attack styles and
novel threats against WSNs. In this case, the newly developed security mechanism should
be estimated with complex wireless channel traps. Considering these ideas, the proposed
WIHFM is motivated to develop a neighbor-based distributed honeypot environment with
IHF traps to attract attackers through the open channel. Mainly, the proposed WIHFM
contributes the following security features for WSNs:

•

On-Demand Acyclic Network Connectivity model (ODAC);
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•
•
•
•

Interleaved Honeypot-Framing Traps;
Distributed Neighbor-based Honeypot Engines;
Secure Hashing with Random Interleaving procedures;
Confidential and Authenticated Channel Protection.

As per the proposed model and technical contributions, the environment of WSNs is
created to optimize the network backbone and dynamic link management principles. As
mentioned in the list of major contributions, the proposed model configures an ODAC for
managing the associativity rules according to uncertain node links and node abilities with
respect to time. According to the positioned ODAC-based network backbone and routing
principles, the wireless communication shall be operated feasibly. In the next phase, wireless honeypot frames are modelled with appropriate fake data (trap frames) and internal
security features among other legitimate data frames in each sensor node. The ordered
inclusion of legitimate data frames and honeypot frames on the wireless channel is designed with the help of honeypot-interleaving procedures (interleaving and de-interleaving
Algorithms) and randomly generated trap-slot positions. Similarly, data communication is
secured by optimal channel security procedures (a secure hashing algorithm, the advanced
encryption standard, and digital signature algorithms). Hence, the proposed model creates
dynamic and distributed honeypot traps in each node to decoy attackers.
According to the contributions listed above, the proposed article has been systematized
from Sections 2–4. In this article, Section 2 describes the materials and methods used
for implementing the proposed techniques. Section 2.1 analyzes the related techniques.
Section 2.2 illustrates the proposed WIHFM’s features and the technical details of the newly
created IHF solutions. Section 3 explains and justifies the proposed WIHFM’s contributions
with experimental results and performance comparisons. Finally, Section 4 concludes the
overall contributions and provides the future scope of this novel article.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Related Works
Analyzing and understanding the current security solutions against various wireless
channel attacks provides necessary future frameworks. In this regard, this article considers significant related contributions of recent research works. Additionally, this section
provides the specific limitations of different research works and the need for a newly
developed WIHFM. Pietro et al. [18] deliberated infrastructure security models and data
security models for unattended WSN environments. Generally, the attacks are undertaken
against sensor data’s start data modifications, false data generation, data removals, and
data disclosures that affect legitimate wireless communication. According to data security
models, this work discussed real-time security problems in the data streams on wireless
channels. Nevertheless, the technical contribution of this model did not provide a versatile
attacker detection system. As the model had been specially developed for unattended
WSNs, the motivation of this work focused on channel attainment rather than crucial
security benefits. Yang et al. [19] provided a perspective on the security benefits in WSNs
such as location-sensitive security principles, distributed key management schemes, resilient network protection, and route classification procedures. This work identified these
approaches as possible solutions against different types of attacks and node failures in
WSNs. As per the contribution, this work developed the WSN security model based on
random location-based key selection for protecting wireless MAC content. Additionally,
this work determined counter-protection mechanisms against fabrication attacks, report
interruption attacks, relocation attacks, and node compromise attacks. However, these
security efforts require novel attacker-handling frameworks.
At the same time, the development of current WSN models and their variances receives
notable industrial considerations. Khan et al. [20] proposed Internet of Things (IoT)-assisted
flying ad hoc networks and energy-optimized-routing strategies. This work considered the
obstacles of energy-efficient-routing protocols such as quality metrics, spatial movements
of nodes, and dynamic network parameters. In this case, this approach proposed naturally
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inspired algorithms for improving the operational abilities of ad hoc routing protocols.
Predominantly, the adaptation of energy-optimized ant colony optimization procedures
were crucially applied to solve routing problems under uncertain network conditions.
In the same manner, Singh et al. [21] found the need for IoT and WSN in healthcare
applications, home control systems, multimedia applications, and smart transportation
solutions. According to this work’s proposal, the current security mechanisms are not
adaptive to the real-time nature of application-specific IoT environments. Based on this
scientific problem, this work stated the need for more dynamic and flexible (self-reliant)
security solutions for various types of networks.
Similarly, the recent advances and security requirements for WSNs and IoT were discussed by Gupta et al. [22] and Bharany et al. [23]. The crucial contributions of the existing
techniques were found in the analysis of performance improvement, energy optimization
solutions, security benefits, cyberspace investigations, machine learning frameworks, and
blockchain-based distributed solutions. As IoT and WSN participants are mostly deployed
under a distributed environment, the detailed analysis on the real-time technical issues
of Gupta et al. [22] and Bharany et al. [23] provided notable information. Xiao et al. [24]
developed MAC security and computation analysis models for IEEE 802.15.4 WSNs. The
analysis models of this work accounted for the various MAC vulnerabilities, security principles, and platform-based overhead issues for personal area sensor network environments.
According to the analysis, the mentioned article enquired about security-provisioning
modes, layer-based vulnerabilities, attack types, security suites, and network adaptability.
Here, the attacks such as replay attacks, nonce attacks, and routing attacks were
investigated under WSN conditions. On the other hand, the need for improvised solutions
was unexploited in this development area.
Boyle et al. [25] and Karlof et al. [26] described various security architectures that can
be provided for WSNs. Both articles show potential security possibilities for a wireless
medium against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, data injection attacks, identity misuse
attacks, and packet-dropping attacks. Particularly, the latter work discussed link-layer
attacks and security mechanisms for IEEE 802.11b and mobile communication platforms.
Considering the security frameworks, these works identified excessive message overloads
and processing overloads under tiny security prototype models. These works deliberately
extracted the basic needs of well-defined wireless security frameworks against channel
attacks. Yet, these analysis models are distorted with respect to providing unpredictable
security solutions for WSNs. Similarly, Yadav et al. [27] discoursed the basic technical
aspects of MAC models and communication tactics for WSNs.
Singh et al. [28] proposed redundant source management techniques and host-based
IDS techniques for securing WSNs. In this regard, this scheme evaluates the possibilities of
brute force attacks, key-breaking attacks, and authentication vulnerabilities. In addition,
the article ensured that the need for identifying MAC-spoofing attacks and MAC duplication attacks was justified to create counter algorithms. The attack detection mechanisms
implemented for building a secure WSN environment should utilize optimal sensor energy. According to the scope, the mentioned security schemes were inefficient in terms of
reactive attack detection accuracy and flexible MAC communication principles. Sachan
et al. [29] created energy-efficient connectivity models for mobile WSNs. This article established a novel probability channel model using network uncertainty, sensing area, node’s
transmission range, and residual energy.
Elshrkawey et al. [30] and Kumar et al. [31] mentioned secure data aggregation and
secure data communication practices for protecting wireless MAC layers in WSNs. Here,
the first article produced individual message authentication codes for each data aggregation channel of WSNs. In this scenario, authentication codes were attached according
to distributed scheduling principles concerning Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)
strategy. Similarly, the second work focused on low-energy clustering protocol and routing
hierarchy model for transmitting the data. This article tried to optimize the sensor node’s
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residual energy to improve the quality of data transmission. Anyway, both works were
limited in terms of complete distributed security solutions against channel vulnerabilities.
Khashan et al. [32] suggested lightweight encryption models for managing secure data
transmission in WSNs. The limitations of conventional encryption models, authentication
procedures, signature validation modules, and energy optimization techniques lead to
the implantation of inaccurate security frameworks. Based on the analysis in practice, the
work mentioned above-validated block chipper techniques, stream chipper techniques, and
flex-crypto schemes for ensuring WSN security and increasing network lifetime. However,
the adaptations of each lightweight encryption technique over different platforms were not
deeply analyzed in the respective contributions.
Almansoori et al. [33] developed Secure Zebra MAC (SZ-MAC) models using elliptic
curve cryptography techniques and hob-based intrusion analysis techniques. In this work, an
elliptic curve cryptography engine was implemented with random key management functions
for securing wireless channels. Particularly, this work deliberated clustered WSN architectures
and hierarchical key distribution models to enable confidential data communication.
This work concluded that the secure SZ-MAC model confirmed optimal elimination of
vulnerable entries and maximum network throughput attainment. The technical aspects of
the work limit the uncertain channel handling and the development of random attacker traps.
Awan et al. [34] proposed Blockchain-Assisted-Secure-routing (BASR) mechanisms for
WSNs. In this work, WSN participants were categorized as data-transmitting nodes and
data aggregator nodes. According to blockchain characteristics, the consensus procedures
initiated multi-path data distribution practices. This model ensured data integrity solutions
using blockchain functions and confidentiality with public key cryptography functions. The
results produced in the experimental section of the work were novel and highly secured
against various attackers. At the same time, the flexibility of blockchain development
is suitable for static WSNs. Consequently, the developed cryptography functions and
blockchain structures were not flexible with respect to random WSNs.
With the same scope, Meena et al. [35] introduced secure random key management
approaches and Trust-Based Node Evaluation (TBNE) approaches for the Internet of Things
(IoT) environment with WSNs. In this analysis, the K-Medoid algorithm and eagle search
algorithm for creating secure clusters were employed. Based on these approaches, the
complete WSN was secured through distributed authentication principles. On this platform,
the dynamic connectivity models and channel recreation models were not defined properly.
From the literature analysis, the proposed article finds the overall limitations of
existing techniques such as the lack of node-centric IDS engines, attacker traps, MAC
confidentiality, interleaved honeypot solutions, and dynamic sensor connectivity models.
These are considered major research limitations to be developed to secure MAC principles.
Based on providing the solutions to the above research expectations, the proposed WIHFM
has been designed and developed with novel technical aspects. Section 2.2 describes the
crucial features and mathematical aspects of WIHFM.
2.2. WIHFM
Channel-aware security principles and medium protection in WSN are creating major
impacts in data communication. WSN contains a vast number of sensor nodes and independent links for establishing each channel. Wireless sessions established from each sensor
node are naturally vulnerable to suspicious activities and attackers. The wireless medium
needs protection in terms of secure MAC policies, secure link establishments, and secure
data transmissions.
The security needs of the wireless medium can be designed and developed based on
various cryptography techniques and Distributed IDS (DIDS) procedures. Figure 1 shows
the proposed security features such as novel interleaved honeypot fames, node-centric
distributed honeypot engines, data integrity, data confidentiality, data authentication, and
DIDS procedures. The proposed channel-aware secure transmissions are expected to secure
each frame before it reaches routing layer protocols. Generally, MAC frames hold three
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c ≥ 1through wireless MAC protocol (IEEE
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Equation (1) shows the basic channel model of WSN. As shown in Equation (1), from
N (s) set of nodes, l − m nodes participate in an active communication channel [38]. At the
moment, the channel quantity factor c ≥ 1. On the other hand, j nodes are idle participants
in WSN. From Equation (1), c can be expressed as follows.
c = nt .dt .ci

(2)

Equation (2) denotes nt .dt as several active nodes during changing time intervals
t. In this case, ci is the channel activity indicator used to keep +1 for live events. The
WSNmodel has been assumed with l (ci ) active channels among overall network channels,
N ci . Equations (1) and (2) mainly determine the presence of wireless sensor nodes in
the network. Notably, a WSN channel model determines both node availability and link
availability according to time domain. Based on the Equations (1) and (2), the network
assumption has been taken based on channel quality factor between multiple sensor nodes.
According to that assumption, c is determined from the number of sensor nodes that are
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available for active communication in a channel at time t. In this regard, ci denotes the
liveliness indication quantity for nt nodes at dt intervals. This component nt .dt .ci is
assumed to be at least 1 to observe the value of c as positive quantity. The positive quantity
of c shows the presence of l − m sensor nodes in the set of total nodes N (s). In this case,
l − m nodes can be activated on the basis of multi-hop on-demand requests in a channel.
The other j nodes are considered as either inactive nodes or dead nodes as their c value has
negative magnitude.
The proposed system creates the On Demand Acyclic Connectivity model (ODAC) for
enabling the logical links between active sensor nodes. The proposed ODAC model enables
energy-sensitive connection establishment rules and association policies among the sensor
nodes in an active channel. According to the model, s(ni ) denotes the source node, s(n j )
denotes the destination node, and the forwarding node (succeeding node) is represented
as x (ni ). Based on ODAC connectivity dynamics, logical connections are established by
sharing beacon messages between sensor nodes. Equation (3) clarifies the basic dynamic
acyclic connectivity model [39,40]. According to the model of acyclic graph connectivity
principles, the sensor nodes in the WSN are able to configure with associativity rules. In
this computation, s(n x ) denotes the node taken for successive evaluation procedures for
establishing acyclic connectivity links along the path between s(ni ) and s(n j ). According
j
to the node, s(nx ) mustbe expected
 with
 minimal cost (diatance) to reach s(n ). This can
j
j
x
be rewritten as f s(n + c s(n , s(n }, and it indicates the cost function between s(n j )
and x (ni ) in the forwarding path.
i



f ( x (n )) =

0 s(n x ) = 0
x , 1 ≤ s(n x ) ≤ l − 1

(3)



n 




where, x = min s(n j , s(n x )) → f s(n j + c s(n j , x (ni }


In this case, x denotes the minmal cost factor. Let us consider d = f s(n j + c s(n j , x (ni )));
the ODAC model can be determined based on residual energy (joules) level (n(e Ri )) and transmission readiness factor (n(eti )) of the sensor node as shown in Equation (4). The relationship
between Equations (3) and (4) describes the identification of s(n x ) as successive x (ni ) associtivity
in the path. In this case, d can be termed as the function of cost metric along the forwarding path.

0 s(n x ) = 0
f ( x (ni )) =
(4)
y , 1 ≤ s(n x ) ≤ l − 1




where, y = min s(n j , x (ni ) → d + n(e Ri + n(eti ))
d( x (ni )) ∝ U (l )

(5)

U (l ) − Channel bias f actor
In the same manner, Equation (5) depicts the relationship between d and the channel
bias factor U (l ) when x (ni ) has been continuously associated with the channel between
s(ni ) and s(n j ). This shows that the channel bias factor directly affects the manipulations of
the succeeding node’s association process in ODAC mechanism. The connectivity between
the sensor nodes is interrupted by different types of attackers. An attacker is a sensor node
that can interpret medium data frames and other control messages. The attacker model
is determined as given in Equation (6). The attacked channel frame, Ch adv , indicates a
particular target frame, T f r , where the legitimate frame sequence f i is in the medium.
Ch adv_

f



= f i − ∂.sig(∇ f i .I f f i , T f r )

(6)

As given in Equation (6), ∂ denotes the attack-tuning function over MAC frames and
I f indicates the frame interference or interruption function. In this equation, ∇ f i specifies
the changes in the MAC frame sequence due to attacker events. The outomes of attack

𝐶ℎ
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𝑓

𝜕. 𝑠𝑖𝑔 𝛻 . 𝐼 𝑓 , 𝑇

(6)

As given in Equation (6), 𝜕 denotes the attack‐tuning function over MAC frames and
𝐼 indicates the frame interference or interruption function. In this equation, 𝛻 specifies
the changes in the MAC frame sequence due to attacker events. The outomes
of attack
10 of 27
interruption function can vary according to different targeted transmissions and channel
frames. The model of 𝐶ℎ _ states the impact of attackers on the channel in addition to
regular
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𝑈 𝑙 . to different targeted transmissions and channel
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discussed,
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the
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interference
functions
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network
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states the
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in addition
to envi‐
ronment.
In thisbias
regard,
𝐼 is U
expressed
as given in Equation (7).
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conditions
( l ).
As discussed, I f denotes the frame interference functions in wireless network environ𝐷 in. 𝐹Equation
. 𝑑𝑡 ∀ 𝑙 (7).
𝑐
ment. In this regard, I f is expressed as𝐼 given

(7)

Equation (7) measures the impact
of adversarial data extraction functions and frame‐
I f = D A . F A .dt ∀ l (ci )
(7)
corrupting functions 𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 concerning changing time intervals, 𝑑𝑡, for all active
_
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and data on the channel, the proposed system creates a secure frame‐interleaving ap‐
data extraction and frame corruption, respectively. To protect the wireless medium and
proach by inserting effective honeypot frames. As given in Figure 2, the data are trans‐
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Figure 3. Internals

As mentioned in Figure 2, HBC is the snippet of boot code for initiating the internal
honeypot engine functions to detect attacker events. As a preview of honeypot attack de‐
tection functions, IVB activates intrusion and attack classification procedures to create ma‐
licious logs and alert messages. Generally, the random IHF sequences (traps) are un‐
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As mentioned in Figure 2, HBC is the snippet of boot code for initiating the internal
honeypot engine functions to detect attacker events. As a preview of honeypot attack
detection functions, IVB activates intrusion and attack classification procedures to create
malicious logs and alert messages. Generally, the random IHF sequences (traps) are
unknown to attackers.
The proposed honeypot frames are inserted based on the frame-interleaving algorithm
at the sender’s end. A sender node activates a honeypot frame-interleaving algorithm
before it transmits the data on a wireless medium. As given in Figure 4, each sender-basedframe-interleaving algorithm works with an internal honeypot frame queue that holds
a collection of fake frames (honeypot frames). Based on proposed honeypot insertions,
wireless MAC protocol carries honeypot-inserted frame data on the channel. This novel
practice creates a random trap for malicious injections. Similarly, the receiver node receives
interleaved frame sequences and executes a honeypot frame-de-interleaving algorithm to 12 of 30
Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEW
obtain the original data. The secure data transmission helps to ensure resilient and flexible
wireless honeypot security assurance [41–44].
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matrix format and Equation (9) shows parity bit generation for inserting IHF between
original wireless frames.
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Algorithm 1. Procedure A.

Procedure (A): gen : rand nLA , s : seed
Input: nL , seed, s : seed
Output: random number, R
1. Get node MAC address (48 bits), nLA
2. Set random seed matrix seed [i ∗ k]
3. Computer, s : seed ∀ ni ci , τ ; ni − sender, ci − channel id, τ − Session id
s : seed = nLA seed [i(x) ∗ k(x)]
n_ri = rand(s : seed||T||N); T − Timestamp , N − Nonce
4. Call the SHA-3 (512 Bits) function and do

R = Sha_3512 nr i
5. Start binary bit string computation,
Rb = tr_bin(R); tr_bin − Bit truncation
6. Redo for all ni .
7. Construct binary Rb matrix, Rb[i ∗ k]
8. Generate random slot bits, R = rand_elect(Rb[i ∗ k])
9. Store Ri in Key [s] iteratively
10. Recall the steps from 1 to 10.
End of Procedure (A)
Algorithm 2. Procedure B. 
Procedure (B): fInter Ri , IHF
Input: Ri
Output: Interleaved Honeypot Frames On Channel
1. Set ni to data transmission mode
2. Get the stream of Ri from Procedure B
3. Set Interleaved Honeypot Frame (IHF) queue IRQi at sender
4. Do for each transmission, n(TXi ) at sender

IfRi == p(1) :


pop IRQi & IRQi (count) − −


Insert fi , fi+1 , IHFi → n(TXi )

If Ri == p
(0) :
Insert fi → n(TXi )
Else :
n(TXi ) → Error
5. Set Deinterleaver Honeypot Frame (DHF) queue DRQi at receiver
6. Do for each reception, n(RXi ) at receiver

IfRi == 1 : 
pop fi , fi+1 , IHFi & push (DRQi )

DRQi (count) + +

If Ri == 0 :
n(RXi ) → Receive Frame
Else :
n(RXi ) → Error
7. Do for all active channels, C(AXi )
8. Call Procedure (A) for each n(TXi ) at C(AXi )
9. Set the number of IHFi as k∝c(I); c(I) − Channel Independence Factor
End of Procedure (B)

Based on the sequence of contiguous bit strings, the parity bits are computed for
managing bit-level similarity at the sender and receiver sides. The node-centric paritychecker function finds odd parity combinations of bit strings to insert the frames.


1
Key [s] = 0
1

0 0 0 1···
0 0 0 1...
0 1 0 1···


1 1
10
1 1

(8)
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p (0|1) =

∑ Key [s] (i ∗ k)

(9)

p

In WSN, there are various open channels available for sensor data transmissions.
However, the active channels are being attacked by malicious activities. Here, the proposed system initiates the IHF solutions for all active wireless channels,C ( AX i ). Figure 5
Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEWillustrates the flow diagram of secure hashing, random bit generations (procedure A), 15 of 30
IHF procedures, DHF procedures, Binary Phase Shift-Keying (BPSK) modulation, and
data-channeling functions.
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IHF on the channel. According to active 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑐 on the wireless channel, the HBC and
IVB of IHF are called to alert the immediate sink nodes of the frame on the channel. For
example, 𝑛 𝑋 forwards the frame sequence to 𝑛 𝑋
through wireless MAC among
attackers. Based on 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑐 on the channel, both 𝑛 𝑋 and 𝑛 𝑋
are alerted to call
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called to alert the immediate sink nodes of the frame on the channel. For example, n( X i )
forwards the frame sequence to n( X i+1 ) through wireless MAC among attackers. Based on
a(maci ) on the channel, both n( X i ) and n( X i+1 ) are alerted to call their internal honeypot
DIDS engines to monitor the runtime attacks. Figure 6 illustrates HBC and IVB activations
Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEW
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to call node-centric honeypot engines. According to Figure 6, procedure C illustrates the
initialization of wireless honeypot frames, WH : Frame(events).
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Algorithm 3. Procedure C.
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Procedure (C) : 𝐖𝐇 : 𝐅𝐫𝐚𝐦𝐞 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬
Output: Attacker logs and report
𝐢
Input:
Attacker
access
𝐚 𝐦𝐚𝐜
1. Do for
all attacker
access
over MAC
frame sequence, a(maci )

If a(mac
IHFireport
) == TRUE) :
Output: Attacker
logsi ,and
Go to step 2.
1. Do for all attacker iaccessi over MAC frame sequence, 𝐚 𝐦𝐚𝐜 𝐢
If a(mac , IHF ) == FALSE) :
𝐚 𝐦𝐚𝐜
𝐓𝐑𝐔𝐄 :
Go𝐈𝐟
to step
3. 𝐢 , 𝐈𝐇𝐅 𝐢
2. Call HBC and IVB functions (Procedure
(D))
Go to step 2.
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𝐢
𝐢
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𝐚 𝐦𝐚𝐜
Make an𝐈𝐟
entry
in the, 𝐈𝐇𝐅
attacker’s record,
A(r: n )
i
i
3. Continue n(TX ) and n(RX )
Go to step 3.
4. Do for all active channels, C(AXi )
2. Call HBC and IVB functions (Procedure (D))
5. Call procedure (A) and procedure (B) for activating each n(TXi ) at C(AXi )
Create an alert to all neighbours, 𝐧𝐧
End of Procedure (C)

Make an entry in the attackerʹs record, 𝐀 𝐫 𝐧
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procedure
and procedure
(B) for
activating
each
𝐓𝐗 𝐢 atworks
based on the 𝐢attacker database and rule-based intrusion detection policies [49,50]. These
𝐂 𝐀𝐗
DIDS policies are executed concerning the sensor node’s local decision-making functions
End
of Procedure
(C) on successful HBC and IVB functions, the security internals
and MAC
alert
functions. Based
of the sensor node call procedure D (shown in Algorithm 4). Procedure D initiates event
analysis
functions
for each
channel
transmission
various
active
intervals.
In this
Compared
to other
existing
mechanisms,
theduring
proposed
wireless
honeypot
principles
ensure real‐time data security only on active channels rather than entire channel connec‐
tions. The reactive security support system provides a novel solution against various at‐
tacks with minimal energy consumption. The attack alert system for each channel works
based on the attacker database and rule‐based intrusion detection policies [49,50]. These
DIDS policies are executed concerning the sensor node’s local decision‐making functions
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traffic analysis procedure, each request of various internal nodes is validated concerning
Rule set(a) to detect the intrusions over the channel.
Algorithm 4. Procedure D.
Procedure (D): IDS_Engine(HBC and IVB)
Input: Data[a(maci )]
Output: Suspicious events detection
1. From Procedure C (step 2)
2. Set node’s internal intrusion dataset I(f)
3. Get events (a(maci )) at node ni ; sender or forwarding node
4. Call IDS_Engine(HBC and IVB) atni
If a(maci , IHFi ) == TRUE) :
Call IDS rule engine functions
Start ule set(a); a − traffic
 attributes,
 Table 1.
Validate If MAC_i ni ==
TRUE


Validate If MAC_ip ni == MAC_i
pr ni

i
Validate If B p ni ==

 B pr n
pr ni − Preceding Node; B p ni − Blocked identifiers,
MACi − Wireless Physical Address of sensor node
5. Start rule-based classification function,
N

CRF = ∑ f(c1 , c2 , c3 . . . . . . cN )∀ C(AXi )
i=1

6. Set event classifier logs for each node
7. Update the logs for each session
8. Redo for all channels
End of Procedure (D)
Table 1. Simulation Specifications.
Simulation Parameters

Details

Simulator Name
Number of Sensor Nodes
Network Area
MAC
Channel Type
Virtual Backbone
MAC Security
Data Traffic
Signal Propagation
Initial Energy (Joules)
Transmission Range (meters)
Channel Frequency (GHz)
Mobility Rate (m/s)
Antenna Model
Routing Protocol
Simulation Time (Seconds)

NS-3.35
Maximum 300
1000 m × 1000 m
IEEE 802.11
Wireless
ODAC
WIHFM
Variable Bit Rate (VBR)
Two Ray Ground
50
150
2.4
10, 20, 30, 40, 50
Omnidirectional
AODV/OLSR
300

The rule-based attack classifiers analyze the sensor node’s request at the receiver
node depending on successful IHF access by any attacker node. Usually, the legitimate
sensor nodes are restricted from accessing IHF as they have been known to interleave
functions. From the technical discussion of the proposed model, the novel wireless IHF
techniques are identified as more reliable security solutions [51–53]. Anyhow, the absence of
confidentiality, authentication, and channel-sealing policies creates channel vulnerabilities
against crucial wireless attacks. In this circumstance, the lightweight encryption algorithms
and authentication algorithms hide the multi-channel data transmissions [54,55]. The
proposed system develops channel-aware Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and
Elliptic Curve Cryptography with Digital Signature (ECCDS) algorithms to protect the data
on the channel.
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Equation (12)
ECCDS with message authentication codes.

𝑚 𝑛

𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒

A(n) = ECCDS(sessionid ||m(n)||t(s)||nc)

(12)

(12)

m(n)𝑡 −𝑠 message
authentication
code
𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝
t(s) − session timestamp

𝑛𝑐

𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒

nc − Random nonce

Thus, the proposed security principles and wireless IHF models protect vulnerable
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IHF models
protectdesign
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WSN Thus,
channels
from attackers.
7 illustrates
the overall
proposed
of WIHFM
WSN channels from attackers. Figure 7 illustrates the overall proposed design of WIand its internal phases. Section 3 provides an experimental circumstance and the perfor‐
HFM and its internal phases. Section 3 provides an experimental circumstance and the
mance benefits of existing and proposed techniques.
performance benefits of existing and proposed techniques.
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3. Results and Discussion
The experimental test has been created based on the technical specifications listed in
Table 1. As per the configured network environment, data communication is initiated
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3. Results and Discussion
The experimental test has been created based on the technical specifications listed
in Table 1. As per the configured network environment, data communication is initiated
through multi-hop channels. In this neighbor-based mode of data communication, each
sensor node shall act as either the source, destination, or forwarding node. The WSN
has been developed with 300 sensor nodes at the maximum population case [56,57]. As
mentioned in the simulation specifications, the proposed WIHFM and ODAC provide
major contributions to virtual wireless channel management policies and IHF policies,
respectively. At the same time, the experiment has been implemented with a routing fusion
of an Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)-routing protocol and Optimal Link
State Protocol (OLSR) to handle multi-channel routing procedures. In this experiment,
the WSN nodes are configured with a random mobility model that attains a velocity rate
between 10 m/s (m/s) and 50 (m/s). The experiment allows both legitimate network nodes
and attacker nodes to build vulnerable channel conditions [58,59].
As the simulation environment has been created for a worst case WSN scenario, in
the configured geographical area (1000 m × 1000 m), the deployment of 300 sensor nodes
with a random mobility model create appropriate complexity levels in terms of population,
channel establishment time, and link management. Generally, the maximum transmission
range of a sensor node is configured up to 100 m. In this scenario, the transmission range
has been increased up to 150 m to acquire the actual performance of a real-time sensor
environment. In this case, a constant position mobility model can also be used for deploying
WSNs. However, the mobility model leads to network uncertainties and random options
for constructing the links and channels for each iteration in the simulation model. This
practice helps to observe the performance of the proposed system under complicated
geographical conditions rather than constantly deployed sensor nodes.
Here, the proposed experimental setup expects a wormhole attacker, a packet-dropping
attacker, an identity theft attacker, a MAC frame-eavesdropping attacker, and a misrouting
attacker. Apart from legitimate sensor nodes, attacker nodes are created in order to initiate
the attacks on various channels. These attacker functions are called from selected attacker
nodes to initiate malicious events randomly, as per the simulation setup. The wormhole
nodes (calling functions to record the neighbor node’s data and tunnel them into another
node) are created around legitimate sensor nodes in the network. The packet-dropping
attacker node calls the functions to collect the data from a legitimate node and drop the
same data at the receiving point itself. In this simulation, the identity theft attacker is
considered to initiate the functions to obtain the neighbors’ identifiers and manipulate
these identifiers due to the attacker’s lack of network reputations. The eavesdropping
attacks in the sensor networks are configured with the simulated functions for recording the
nearest data transmissions of any node. Finally, the misrouting attack calls the simulated
functions that change the legitimate routing table entities into fraudulent entities. The
legitimate sensor nodes shall expect any attack from other nodes to be intercepted by the
wireless channel. The network simulation arrangement has been deployed using Network
Simulator (NS-3.35) tool. In this work, we have implemented network setup and data
transmission scenarios using the C++ options of NS-3. Similarly, the internal functions
of the existing techniques and proposed models were created with the help of python
library files. The proposed model has been developed and compared with the notable
existing techniques such as SZ-MAC, BASR, and TBNE. The proposed work and the works
acquired for the experimental comparison are implemented in the NS-3 tool under the
specified network environment (Table 1) and network features. This evaluation identifies
the contributions of each work against uniform network natures and provides a reasonable
outcome. Figure 8 exemplifies the production latency (milliseconds (msec)) of WIHF in the
wireless channel. The transformation of IHFs into legitimate frames in the wireless channel
employs reasonable latency values at different sessions: T1, T2, T3, and T4.
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Figure 9 illustrates the increasing number of sensor nodes from 50 to 300 at the dif‐
ferent iterations of the simulation. On the other side, the changing communication ses‐
sions T1, T2, T3, and T4 receive frequent attacker requests to intercept the channel activi‐
ties that are identified and isolated in order to distribute the honeypot environment. 19
Inof 27
this manner, Figures 8 and 9 provide the IHF production latency and the benefit of using
IHF traps, respectively. Consequently, the activation of the honeypot engines and their
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As shown in Figure 10, the response time is slowly increasing as the number
nodes increases at the iterative slots. The increasing number of nodes increases the overall
channel liveliness and multiprocessing heaps.
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Compared to other channel security models, the proposed WIHFM creates complex
random honeypot trap possibilities uniquely [63]. Consequently, malicious events are
widely trapped under IHFs. The malicious events are categorized under false data injections, wormhole starts, packet drops, identity hacks, and other channel intrusions through
MAC frames. Figure 11 shows the proposed model’s true positive rate between 89.8% and
99.6%. At the same time, the existing techniques achieve a rate of true positives between
91.6% and 97.6%. Figure 12 clarifies the average routing delay for each data transmission
during vulnerable channel activities. As discussed, the proposed model has23a better
honeySensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEW
of 30
pot management system with limited latency rates. Additionally, the fusion of AODV and
OLSR enables fast route updates during attacker interactions.
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The proposed functional internals of each security technique consume significant
computation overhead from 12.6% to 16.8%. In these cases, the proposed model achieves
a slightly improved overhead compared to other techniques between 12.6% and 14.9%.
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The proposed functional internals of each security technique consume significant
computation overhead from 12.6% to 16.8%. In these cases, the proposed model achieves
a slightly improved overhead compared to other techniques between 12.6% and 14.9%.
Similarly, BASR attains its maximum overhead of 15.6%. Compared to other security
techniques, the proposed model has lightweight IHF procedures, distributed honeypot
management principles, and attack detection rules in each node. Hence, the proposed
WIHFM manages the finest computation overhead from among the other systems,
Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEW
24 ofas
30
the velocity of the sensor node varies from 10 m/s to 50 m/s. In the same manner,
the important feature of the proposed security framework is examined using a secure
throughout probability rate as given in Figure 14. Secure throughput is defined as the rate
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cryptography complexities. According to the experiments, AES/ECCDS fusion takes 127
KB in the node’s memory and 515 msec of latency. In contrast, other approaches such as
the Data Encryption Standard/Rivest Shamir Adleman (DES/RSA), AES/ Digital Signature
Algorithm (AES/DSA), Twofish/DSA, and Diffie–Hellman (DH)/ECCDS have considera‐
ble complexities under time and space domains. According to the complexity analysis, the
AES/ECCDS suite is identified as a compatible technique for tiny sensor nodes.
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As the proposed method uses AES and ECCDS for establishing channel confidentiality
and neighbor authentication, respectively, Table 2 provides an understanding of cryptography complexities. According to the experiments, AES/ECCDS fusion takes 127 KB in the
node’s memory and 515 msec of latency. In contrast, other approaches such as the Data
Encryption Standard/Rivest Shamir Adleman (DES/RSA), AES/ Digital Signature Algorithm (AES/DSA), Twofish/DSA, and Diffie–Hellman (DH)/ECCDS have considerable
complexities under time and space domains. According to the complexity analysis, the
AES/ECCDS suite is identified as a compatible technique for tiny sensor nodes.
Likewise, Table 3 provides the working strategies and response times for the various
cryptography suites. As per the identifications, the response time of AES/ECCDS is a
minimum of 485 msec compared to other suites. In this regard, the lightweight encapsulation adaptability of the AES/ECCDS suites is better for the sensor node platform
with respect to improving the channel security. This experiment reveals that other suites
achieve response times between 638 msec and 780 msec as maximum quantities compared
to the AES/ECCDS suite. The importance of virtual link management functions has been
evaluated, as shown in Table 4. The observations of Tables 2–4 are extracted from the
simulator to evaluate the complexity levels of the channel security mechanisms. The details
do not replicate any other sources. The purpose of this complexity evaluation is to justify
the choice of the appropriate security frameworks for resource-limited wireless sensor
networks.
Table 3. Response Time and Security Strategy.
Security
Techniques
DES/RSA
AES/DSA
Twofish/DSA
DH/ECCDS
AES/ECCDS

Working Strategy

Lightweight
Encapsulation
Adaptability

Response Time
(Milliseconds)

Symmetric/Authentication
Symmetric/Authentication
Symmetric/Authentication
Asymmetric/Authentication
Symmetric/Authentication

780
638
645
704
485

No
No
No
No
Yes

Table 4. Dynamic Channel Recreation Strategy.
Backbone Management Strategies
WIHFM-ODAC
BASR
SZ-MAC
TBNE

Channel Recreation Latency (msec)
87
126
137
155

In this evaluation, the proposed WIHFM-ODAC system achieves an optimal channel
recreation time (msec) during attacker interruptions (Figure A1) and other channel interruptions. At the same time, BASR, SZ-MAC, and TBNE consume more channel recreation time,
which disturbs the overall network liveliness. Consequently, the rate of channel availability
reduces frequently for all sessions in the network. As the ODAC has on-demand connectivity establishment functions based on dynamic graph computations, the sustainability of
each wireless channel is recreated more optimally than in other models. In this experiment,
the specificity metric plays an important role in determining the capability of the system in
order to show the correctly measured legitimate frames. In particular, the system specificity
is defined as tn/(tn + f p). In this metric, tn − true negative; f p − f alse positive.
Table 5 illustrates the observed specificity rates (%) of the proposed models and existing techniques. The better performance of the proposed model against the existing
techniques is attained through a secretly interleaved frame analysis and distributed honeypot model activation procedures.
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Table 5. System Specificity.
Backbone Management Strategies
WIHFM
BASR
SZ-MAC
TBNE

Specificity (%)
98.95
95.08
95.34
94.56

In this manner, the resiliency of ODAC has been justified. Thus, the proposed WIHFM
ensures secure wireless communication through significantly developed IHF functions
(Figures A2 and A3). In addition, the proposed WIHFM can be applied for the benefits
of moderate security platforms and applications. Specifically, the application of WSNs in
home automation systems and agriculture systems requires moderate or minimal security
considerations [66,67]. Under these environments, the proposed WIHFM and distributed
security policies defend against outsiders’ or attackers’ intrusion into any network device
(sensor node). Notably, the performance of WIHFM for minimal security applications
inevitably reaches the maximum specificity rate and sensitivity rate. At the same time, the
sensor nodes adopted for agricultural networks and home automation networks require
suitable computation capabilities to achieve the maximum secure throughput rate through
the channels. In addition, the rate of computation efficiency and power efficiency decides
the successful execution of WIHFM’s procedures in each sensor node. Consequently, the
application of the proposed WIHFM needs environmental validation processes and configuration validation processes to ensure optimal energy consumption, latency, throughput,
sensitivity, and specificity in real-time.
4. Conclusions
The security principles and cryptography mechanisms used for protecting data communications are widely practiced among various types of wireless networks. However,
the identification of a novel MAC security management system supports resilient WSN
protection against various attackers. In this article, the proposed system was implemented
with distributed WIHFM and ODAC virtual link management features. As per the newly
developed model, the IHF features were identified as novel distributed solutions implemented in each sensor node of the WSN. Similarly, the WIHFM enabled IHF computations
and distributed wireless honeypot engines to create random attacker traps to coax the
attackers into forged honeypot resources of the sensor node. Based on the proposed model,
the attackers and the malicious activities were effectively trapped in IHFs. Consequently,
the trapped accesses were recognized as either intrusions or attacks. Finally, the proposed
model was compared with the existing frameworks such as BASR, SZ-MAC, and TBNE,
as shown in the experimental section. Moreover, the proposed WIHFM outclassed other
techniques, as discussed through various performance metrics. However, the proposed
WIHFM has limitations regarding its uncertain IHF latency and honeypot response time
as the network dynamics change continuously. Future technical aspects, such as the intelligent network dynamic analysis model, dynamic programming model, and uncertainty
computation model, are expected to compensate the limitations of WIHFM.
As the current network MAC models are not optimally enriched with low-powered
dynamic programming solutions against channel uncertainties, the need to improve the
static limitations of WIHFM is required in the future. In addition, the next-generation
honeypot solutions in the wireless environment are expected to be improved with these
distributed trap management policies for application-specific sensor platforms. Notably, the
next-generation WSN models are widely sensitive to the energy utilization rate with respect
to their application platform. Considering the internals of notable WSNs’ applications,
the proposed novel WIHFM can be implemented for military sensor networks, healthcare
sensor networks, and other deployment strategies exclusively in the future.
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